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ABSTRACT 
 
In a recent paper, Jalbert (2002) develops and tests valuations equations for firms that are subject to pass-
through taxation and for firms that are subject to double taxation.  This work is extended by Jalbert and 
Dukes (2003) who examine the implications of a zero percent tax rate on dividend income.   In this paper, we 
extend this line of work by developing equations for the implied changes in firm capital structure around a 
change in tax regime.  The results show that firms change their capital structures in predictable ways when 
tax rates change.  These results are important for determining likely changes in firm policy around future tax 
regime changes.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
any models have been developed to value firms and determine optimal capital structures for firms.  
Among the most famous of these models is developed in Miller (1977).  Miller (1977) developed his 
model utilizing a number of assumptions including assumptions about dividends and cash flow 
growth.  Specifically, Miller (1977) assumed that dividends are delayed for a sufficient amount of 
time so that the effective personal tax rate on income from equity ownership is zero.  This 
assumption implies that firms retain a substantial amount of cash flows within the firm.  He also utilized a perpetuity 
approach to develop his model.  The perpetuity approach implies that the firm's NOI does not change from year-to-
year.  Jalbert (2002) argues that the combination of assumptions used by Miller are not consistent.  Earnings retention 
implies a corresponding increase in the firm’s asset base, which in turn implies NOI growth in subsequent years.  NOI 
growth violates the perpetuity assumption that cash flows remain constant from year-to-year.  Thus the combination of 
assumptions utilized by Miller (1977) is unlikely to occur.  Jalbert (2002) developed a model based on the work of 
Miller (1977) that addresses the problematic assumptions of Miller.  Jalbert (2002) assumes that all cash flows are 
perpetuities, implying that the cash flows of the firm do not grow and that that all cash flows of the firm, except those 
cash flows necessary to replace depreciating equipment on a one-for-one basis, are paid out as dividends.  The 
assumptions utilized by Jalbert (2002) are internally consistent and thus offer an improvement over the work of Miller 
(1977).  Utilizing these assumptions, Jalbert (2002) develops equations for both firms subject to the pass-through 
taxation system (PTF) and for firms subject to their double taxation system (DTF).  The equations are developed for 
both the unlevered (a firm that does not borrow money) and levered firm (a firm that borrows money).  The equations 
for the levered and unlevered DTF and the levered and unlevered PTF respectively are given by: 
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Where: 
 
V
UD
= the value of an unleverd DTF 
V
LD
= the value of a levered DTF 
V
UP
= the value of an unlevered PTF 
V
LP
= the value of a levered PTF 
TPS  = the personal tax rate on income from stocks 
TPB = the personal tax rate on income from bonds 
TC  = the entity-level tax rate 
NOI = the net operating income of the firm 
Kd = the interest rate on debt 
D = the book value of the debt outstanding 
 = the discount rate for an all-equity firm of equivalent risk 
Kb  = the risk-free rate of interest 
E = the expectations operator 
 
The above equations imply a gain from leverage for the DTF and PTF respectively of: 
 
b
PSCPBdLD
K
TTTDK
G
)]1)(1()1[( 
                     (5) 
 
b
PSPBdLP
K
TTDK
G
)]1()1[( 
                      (6) 
 
Miller (1977) argues that while there is an optimal capital structure for the economy as a whole, there is not 
an optimal capital structure for individual firms.  Jalbert (2002) on the other hand argues that there is an optimal 
capital structure for individual firms. Jalbert (2002) finds that firms subject to pass-through taxation have a higher 
value per dollar of net operating income than firms subject to double taxation.  Moreover his results suggest that this 
difference is mitigated when firms use higher levels of debt in their capital structures.  Jalbert (2002) also finds that 
DTFs use more debt in their capital structures, after controlling for firm size and risk, than PTFs.  The results of the 
test indicate that DTFs are not more efficient in transforming sales into net operating income than PTFs, contrary to 
what was expected, leaving open the question of why DTFs continue to exist in the economy.  Several alternative 
explanations are offered for the continued existence of DTFs.   
 
Jalbert and Dukes (2003) extend the work of Jalbert (2002) by examining the implications of the Jalbert 
(2002) model with regard to the Bush tax proposal to eliminate taxes on dividend income.  They develop modified 
equations and argue that the value of DTFs would increase relative to their PTF counterparts if the tax proposal were 
adopted.  They argue that DTFs would reduce their reliance on debt and increase their reliance on equity financing if 
the Bush proposal were adopted.  Moreover, firms should be expected to increase their dividend payout ratios.   
 
In this paper, we extend the work of Jalbert (2002) and Jalbert and Dukes (2003) by explicitly modeling the 
change in capital structure expected as a result of a change in tax regimes.  The implied changes are tested using a 
paired sample of master limited partnerships (MLPs), which are subject to the pass-through taxation system and C-
corporations, which are subject to the double taxation system.  This research is particularly timely given ongoing 
debates about optimal tax policies and likely tax regime changes. The analysis begins by examining the theoretical 
change in value associated with tax rate changes followed by an analysis of the theoretical change in gains from 
leverage associated with tax rate changes.  Next, we examine the theoretical implications of the 1986 Tax Reform Act 
(1986 TRA) on the gain from leverage.  Finally, we test these implications using two paired samples of MLP’s and C-
Corporations. 
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THEORETICAL CHANGES IN VALUATION 
 
The responses of firm values to changes in tax rates can be measured by taking the first derivative of the 
valuation and gain from leverage equations outlined above with respect to changes in the various tax rates.  The 
analysis is completed first for DTFs then for PTFs.  The partial derivative of the double taxation unlevered (Eq. 1) and 
levered (Eq. 2) equations with respect to changes in the corporate tax rate are respectively: 
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The value of the unlevered DTF will respond negatively to an increase in the entity-level tax rate while the response of 
an unlevered DTF to a change in entity-level tax rate is ambiguous, depending on the relative sizes the E(NOI), , Kd, 
D, and Kb.   The partial derivative of the double taxation unlevered (Eq. 1) and levered (Eq. 2) firms respectively with 
respect to a change in the personal tax rate on income from equity is: 
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The value of the unlevered DTF will respond negatively to a change in the personal tax rate on income from equity 
while the response of the levered DTF to a change in the personal tax rate on income from equity is ambiguous 
depending upon E(NOI), , Kd, D, and Kb.  Next, the partial derivative of the unlevered (Eq. 1) and levered (Eq. 2) 
DTFs respectively with respect to a change in the personal tax rate on income from bonds is: 
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The value of the unlevered DTF should not be affected by a change in the personal tax rate on income from bonds 
however, the value of the levered DTF will respond negatively to a change in the personal tax rate on income from 
bonds.   
 
Next, the analysis is completed for PTFs.  The partial derivative of the pass-through taxation unlevered (Eq. 
3) and levered (Eq. 4) equations with respect to a change in the personal tax rate on income from equity respectively 
are: 
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The value of the unlevered PTF is negatively related to the personal tax rate on equity income. The relationship 
between the value of the levered PTF and the personal tax rate on income from equity is ambiguous depending on the 
levels of E(NOI), , KD, D, and Kb.  The partial derivatives of the value of the unlevered (Eq. 3) and levered (Eq. 4) 
PTF respectively with respect to a change in the personal tax rate on income from bonds are:  
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The value of the unlevered PTF is not affected by a change in the personal tax rate on income from bonds while the 
value of the PTF is negatively related to the personal tax rate on income from bonds.  Because the PTF does not pay 
the entity-level tax, entity-level taxes are not included in the valuation equations for the PTF.  Thus, the value of the 
PTF will not be affected by changes in the entity-level tax. 
 
CHANGES IN GAINS FROM LEVERAGE 
 
The implied changes in the gain from leverage changes associated with tax rate change are examined first for 
DTFs then for PTFs.  The partial derivative of the gain from leverage for a DTF (Eq. 5) with respect to changes in TC, 
TPS, and TPB respectively is given by the following equations: 
 


G
T
K D
K
T
LD
C
d
b
PS ( )1                     (17) 


G
T
K D
K
T
LD
PS
d
b
C ( )1                      (18) 


G
T
K D
K
LD
PB
d
b
  .                     (19) 
 
The gain in leverage in a DTF is positively related to both the corporate tax rate and the personal tax rate while the 
gain from leverage in a DTF is negatively related to the personal tax rate on income from bonds.  These findings are 
consistent with the findings of Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) who incorporate bankruptcy costs and various 
assumptions in their model and demonstrate that the gain from leverage will be positively related to the personal tax 
rate on income from stocks. 
 
The partial derivative of the gain from leverage in a PTF (Eq. 6) with respect to changes in TC, TPS, and TPB 
respectively is given by the following equations: 
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The gain from leverage in a PTF is not affected by a change in the entity-level tax rate.  The gain from leverage in a 
PTF is positively related to the personal tax rate on income from equity.  The gain from leverage in a PTF is negatively 
related to the personal tax rate on income from bonds.     
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THE 1986 TRA 
 
Utilizing the above equations, the theoretical change in the gain from leverage associated with the 1986 TRA 
can be identified.  The tax reform act of 1986 reduced the highest marginal personal tax rate on ordinary income from 
50 percent to 38.5 percent in 1987 and to 33 percent in 1988.  The tax reform act of 1986 increased the highest 
marginal personal tax rate on capital gains from 20 percent to 28 percent.  Corporate tax rates were reduced by the 
1986 TRA.  The top marginal corporate tax rate was lowered from about 50 percent to 45 percent in 1987 and to 39 
percent for 1988 and subsequent years.  In summary, the 1986 TRA reduced ordinary income tax rates, increased 
capital gains tax rates, and lowered corporate tax rates.     
 
Because the personal tax rate on income from stocks, the personal tax rate on income from bonds and the 
corporate tax rates all underwent changes during this time period, the total differential of the gain from leverage for 
both the DTF and the PTF are examined with respect to changes in tax rates.  These differentials indicate the change in 
the gain from leverage from simultaneous changes in tax rates, all else held constant.  The total differential of the gain 
from leverage for the DTF with respect to a change in tax rates is given by: 
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The decrease in corporate tax rates associated with the 1986 TRA implies a decrease in the gain from leverage for the 
DTF.   The decrease in ordinary income tax rates (the personal tax rate on income from bonds) implies an increase in 
the gain from leverage for the DTF.  The increase in the capital gains tax rate (the personal tax rate on income from 
equity) implies an increase in the gain from leverage for the DTF.  Thus the effect of the 1986 TRA on the gain from 
leverage for the DTF is ambiguous depending on the magnitude of the corporate tax rate change relative to the 
magnitude of the change in personal tax rates on ordinary income and capital gains. 
  
To examine the change in the gain from leverage for the PTF associated with the 1986 TRA, the total 
differential of the gain from leverage with respect to a change in tax rates is examined.  The total differential of the 
gain from leverage for the PTF with respect to a change in tax rates is given by the following equation: 
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The change in the corporate tax rate associated with the 1986 TRA is not expected to affect the gain from 
leverage for the PTF.  The decrease in the personal tax rate on ordinary income associated with the 1986 TRA 
increased the gain from leverage associated with the PTF.  The increase in the personal tax rate on capital gains 
associated with the 1986 TRA is also increased the gain from leverage associated with the PTF.  The combination of a 
decrease in the personal tax rate on income from bonds and an increase in the personal tax rate on income from stocks 
results in an unambiguous increase in the gain from leverage for PTFs. 
 
 Overall, the relative gain from leverage is expected to become larger for PTFs than for DTFs as a result of the 
1986 TRA for two reasons.  First, the decrease in corporate tax rates reduces the gain from leverage for DTFs, while it 
does not affect the gain from leverage for PTFs.  Secondly, the increase in the gain from leverage associated with the 
increase in the personal tax rate on income from stocks is less for the DTFs than for the PTFs, because the gain is 
reduced by the amount TC for DTFs. 
 
 From the above observations, it is argued that the gain from leverage increased by more for PTFs than for 
DTFs as a result of the 1986 TRA.  It is further argued that firm managers will attempt to take advantage of increased 
gains from leverage by increasing the debt level in their firms.  Because the change in the gain from leverage is higher 
for PTFs relative to DTFs after the 1986 TRA, it is expected that PTFs to increase their leverage relative to C 
corporations around the 1986 TRA.  This observation leads to the following testable hypothesis: 
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Ho:   The debt-to-assets (debt-to-equity) ratio for PTFs relative to the debt-to-assets (deb t- to-equity) ratio for 
DTFs did not change as a result of the tax rate changes associated with the 1986 TRA. 
Ha:   The debt-to-assets (debt-to-equity) ratio for PTFs relative to the debt-to-assets (debt - to-equity) ratio for 
DTFs increased as a result of the tax rate changes associated with the 1986 TRA.   
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The focus of the empirical section of this study is on the capital structure implications of the model developed 
in Jalbert (2002) as they relate to the 1986 TRA.  In order to examine these implications a sample of PTFs and two 
samples of DTFs are compared.  The sample of PTFs is MLPs taken from the Standard and Poor’s Year-End Stock 
Guides and Compustat data file documentation.  Those firms with names ending in L.P., partnership, or otherwise 
denoted as a MLP in the footnotes were selected.  This procedure identified a sample of 94 MLPs that existed between 
1983 and 1994.  Two samples of domestic C corporations were selected for comparison to control for factors that have 
been shown to affect valuation and capital structure.  Substantial evidence exists to suggest that industry; size and risk 
have an affect on firm valuation and the capital structure that the firm adopts (Titman and Wessels 1986, Banz 1981, 
Fama and French 1992, Shaw and Weir 1993, Guenther 1992 and others). The first sample of C corporations is the 
size-control group.   The sample was created by selecting C corporations that most closely matched the industry, as 
measured by CIC code, and size, as measured by total assets, of each MLP.  The second sample of C corporations is 
the risk-control group.  The sample was created by selecting C corporations that most closely matched each MLPs 
industry, and risk, as measured by beta in accordance with Scholes and Williams (1977), of each MLP.  Each firm pair 
was categorized as being a firm in the oil related industry, or a firm not in the oil related industry.  This categorization 
is made because of unique accounting techniques applied to oil firms and because of the large losses that oil firms 
experienced in the 1980’s (Harris & Ohlson 1987 & 1990, Shaw and Weir 1993, Magliano 1986 and others).  
 
Annual data are collected for each firm from the Compustat data files, Standard and Poor’s Corporate Reports 
and Moody’s Bond Guides resulting in 624 annual data observations for each of the samples.  Tax rate data are 
obtained from Henderson (1989) and were updated by examining Annual Internal Revenue Service Tax Guides.  Year-
end data on the yield for each bond rating is obtained from the Standard and Poor’s December Bond Guide.   
 
To test this implication of the model, the behavior of firms in the time period before and after passage of the 
1986 TRA are examined.  Two tests are conducted, an overall test and a yearly test.  The overall test is intended to 
provide broad evidence of a change in capital structure while the yearly test is intended to identify more subtle changes 
that may have occurred.  The overall test measures changes in debt level differences among firms that existed both 
prior and subsequent to the 1986 TRA.  Thus only those firms that existed both prior and subsequent to 1986 are 
included in this analysis.  The measure of debt is the debt-to-assets ratio and the debt-to-equity ratio.  The average 
debt-to-assets (debt-to-equity) ratio for each firm is calculated for the years prior to the tax rate changes in 1987 and 
1988 and for the years after the tax rate changes took effect.  The average debt-to-assets (debt-to-equity) ratio prior to 
the tax reform act is calculated as the average debt-to-assets (debt-to-equity) ratio of the firm over the years 1984, 
1985 and 1986.  The average debt-to-assets (debt-to-equity) ratio after the tax reform act is calculated as the average 
debt-to-assets (debt-to-equity) ratio of the firm over the years 1989, 1990, and 1991.  The unit of measurement is the 
change in the debt to equity ratio for each firm.  Of interest is to determine if the median, debt-to-assets (debt-to-
equity) ratio for MLPs relative to C corporations increased as a result of the 1986 TRA as predicted.  The one tailed 
Mann Whitney test is used to determine if the median difference in debt to equity ratios between DTFs and PTFs 
increased as a result of the 1986 tax rate changes.   
 
The yearly test is completed using all of the firms that existed in a given year.  In this analysis, firms that 
existed at any time during the sample period are analyzed.  For this test, the variable of interest is the level of the debt-
to-assets (debt-to-equity) ratio.  Again, the Mann Whitney test is used to determine if the median level of debt is 
different for MLP’s and C-Corporations.  In both the overall and yearly tests, the analysis is performed on the full 
sample as well as sub samples of oil industry firms and non-oil industry firms.  The debt-to-equity tests are also 
performed using both the maximum marginal tax rate on ordinary income and the average marginal tax rate on 
ordinary income.   As the results are quite similar, only the tests based on the maximum marginal tax rate are reported 
in this paper. 
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THE TEST RESULTS 
 
The results of the size-matched sample test are reported first followed by the risk-matched sample tests.  The 
tables follow a common format.  The first column reports the results of the overall test.  The columns with year 
headings report the results of the yearly tests.  The results of tests for changes in debt levels utilizing the size matched 
sample are reported in Tables 1 and 2.  In Table 1, the debt-to-assets ratio is examined and in Table 2, the debt-to-
equity ratio is examined.  In Panel A of Table 1, the test results for the full sample are presented, in panel B, the results 
of the test on the non-oil sub sample are reported and in Panel C, the results of the oil firm sub sample are reported.  
The overall tests provide no evidence of a change in debt levels around the 1986 TRA for the full sample or either of 
the sub samples.  However, the yearly results do provide evidence of a change in debt levels.  In the full sample, prior 
to 1986 there were no significant differences in debt levels, but in 1986 and subsequent years, significant differences 
are evident.  Debt levels among MLPs increased from 18 percent in 1984 to 37 percent in 1994, while the debt levels 
of C-corporations remained relatively constant during the same time period.  It should be noted that part of this result 
could be driven by a change in sample size.  Despite the change in sample size however a shift in capital structure is 
apparent.  In 1986, C-corporations had 11 percent more debt in their capital structures than MLPs.  By 1994, the MLPs 
had 3 percent more debt in their capital structure than the C-corporations.  In the non-oil sub sample it is clear that 
MLPs increased their levels of debt relative to C-corporations around the 1986 TRA.   In 1984 and 1985, MLPs had 
only 18 and 13 percent debt respectively.  In 1986, this level jumped to 22 percent and in 1987 to 28 percent.  By 
1994, the debt level had risen to 37 percent.  During the same time period, the level of debt in the matched C-
corporations remained relatively constant.   In the oil sub sample, a gradual increase in the debt level of MLP’s relative 
to C-corporations is evident.  The debt level of MLP’s increased from 16 percent in 1984 to 37 percent in 1994 again 
with the level of debt among C-corporations remaining relatively constant during the same time period. 
 
In Table 2, the results of the test on changes in debt levels utilizing the debt-to-equity measure of debt are 
reported.  The overall test results are mixed.  The overall test on the full sample and non-oil sub sample provide no 
evidence of a change in capital structure around the 1986 TRA.  However, the overall test does indicate a significant 
change in the non-oil sub sample.  The evidence indicates that the differential in debt levels was reduced as a result of 
the 1986 TRA.  The results of the yearly tests on the full sample indicate a clear increase in debt levels among MLPs, 
with debt going from 3 percent of the capital structure in 1985 to 24 percent in 1994.  The results are similar for both 
of the sub samples.  Moreover, the bulk of the change occurs in the years 1986-1989 as would be expected if the 
capital structure adjustments are driven by a change in tax regimes as is suggested by the theory.  While the debt-to-
assets test above indicated that MLPs used more debt in their capital structure, the evidence from the debt-to-equity 
tests suggest that while the debt levels of MLPs increased, they have not surpassed the levels of the C-corporations.   
 
Next, we turn to the risk matched test results.  The results are reported in Tables 3 and 4.  In Table 3, the debt-
to-assets ratio is examined and in Table 4, the debt-to-equity ratio is examined.  The overall results presented in Table 
3 provide no evidence of a change in debt levels around the 1986 TRA in the full sample or either of the sub samples.  
The results of the yearly tests for the full sample and both sub samples indicate a clear increase in the use of debt by 
MLPs relative to C-corporations.  In each case, debt levels for MLP’s go from the mid teen percentages to the high 30 
percentages between 1984 and 1994.  Again, the evidence indicates that by 1994, MLPs were using more debt in their 
capital structures than C-corporations. 
 
The results of the test on changes in debt levels utilizing the debt-to-equity measure of debt are reported in 
Table 4.  The overall test results provide no evidence of a change in debt levels around the 1986 TRA for the full 
sample or either of the sub samples.   Similar to the results for the size matched sample, the yearly test results indicate 
a clear shift in capital structure among MLP relative to their matched C-corporation counterparts.  This result holds for 
both the full sample and for both of the sub samples.  Like the size matched results, the results here indicate that when 
measured by debt-to-equity levels, despite increasing, the debt levels of MLPs do not surpass those of C-corporations.   
 
In general, the overall test results provide little evidence that debt level differentials were reduced in response 
to the 1986 TRA.  However, the yearly tests provide strong evidence of a shift in capital structures around the 1986 
TRA.  Specifically, the evidence suggests that C-corporations maintained relatively constant debt levels around the 
1986 TRA, while MLPs increased their debt levels substantially.   
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Table 1:  Changes in the debt-to-assets ratios and debt-to-assets ratio levels for the size matched sample around the 1986 TRA. 
 
Description Overall 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 
Panel A: 
All Firms  N 
Median MLP 
Median C co. 
M.W. T 
P-Value 
 
43 
0.0129 
0.0138 
0.4169 
0.3398 
 
12 
0.3016 
0.4118 
-0.6571 
0.2654 
 
16 
0.1775 
0.3376 
-1.217 
0.1219 
 
25 
0.2385 
0.2745 
-0.9401 
0.1781 
 
52 
0.2498 
0.3609 
-2.736 
0.0047*** 
 
66 
0.2624 
0.3444 
-2.099 
0.0202** 
 
68 
0.2581 
0.3528 
-2.510 
0.0076*** 
 
63 
0.2671 
0.3636 
-2.373 
0.0108** 
 
62 
0.3049 
0.3501 
-2.172 
0.0173** 
 
64 
0.2765 
0.3687 
-2.056 
0.0223** 
 
65 
0.3196 
0.3832 
-1.643 
0.0528* 
 
65 
0.3343 
0.3701 
-1.230 
0.1114 
 
60 
0.3712 
0.3384 
-0.5916 
0.2780 
Panel B: 
Non-Oil  N 
Median MLP 
Median C co. 
M.W. T 
P-Value 
 
27 
0.0171 
0.0092 
0.7147 
0.2460 
 
8 
0.3016 
0.4202 
-0.4086 
0.3559 
 
10 
0.1811 
0.3817 
-0.7482 
0.2404 
 
12 
0.1383 
0.3680 
-0.9816 
0.1752 
 
32 
0.2240 
0.3777 
-2.052 
0.0252** 
 
46 
0.2893 
0.3397 
-1.376 
0.0878* 
 
46 
0.2364 
0.3450 
-2.105 
0.0210** 
 
42 
0.2793 
0.3608 
-2.100 
0.0216** 
 
44 
0.3288 
0.3872 
-1.836 
0.0371** 
 
44 
0.3396 
0.3910 
-1.565 
0.0626* 
 
46 
0.3313 
0.3868 
-1.135 
0.1309 
 
46 
0.3589 
0.3725 
-0.7091 
0.2407 
 
44 
0.3712 
0.3343 
-0.3156 
0.3775 
Panel C: 
Oil Firms  N 
Median MLP 
Median C co. 
M.W. T 
P-Value 
 
16 
0.0002 
0.0228 
-0.1113 
0.5373 
 
4 
0.2718 
0.3523 
-0.4089 
0.3900 
 
6 
0.1645 
0.2815 
-0.7866 
0.2431 
 
13 
0.2621 
0.2616 
-0.1760 
0.4395 
 
20 
0.2598 
0.3573 
-1.749 
0.0495** 
 
20 
0.2445 
0.3545 
-1.779 
0.0469** 
 
22 
0.2605 
0.3973 
-1.400 
0.0884** 
 
21 
0.2671 
0.3841 
-1.201 
0.1220 
 
18 
0.2919 
0.3232 
-1.013 
0.1629 
 
20 
0.2412 
0.3405 
-1.340 
0.0985* 
 
19 
0.3044 
0.3467 
-1.343 
0.1252 
 
19 
0.3232 
0.3379 
-1.189 
0.1252 
 
16 
0.3771 
0.3405 
-0.8249 
0.2120 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level, **   indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
 
 
Table 2:  Change in the debt-to-equity ratios and debt-to-equity ratio levels for the size matched sample 
 
Description Overall 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 
Panel A: 
All Firms  N 
Median MLP 
Median C co. 
M.W. T 
P-Value 
 
32 
0.0103 
-0.0103 
1.199 
0.1196 
 
11 
0.0970 
0.2393 
-1.838 
0.0511* 
 
14 
0.0761 
0.2170 
-2.041 
0.0336** 
 
22 
0.0360 
0.1693 
-3.309 
0.0025*** 
 
40 
0.0618 
0.2743 
-3.576 
0.0007*** 
 
59 
0.1020 
0.3096 
-3.208 
0.0013*** 
 
65 
0.1243 
0.3960 
-3.773 
0.0003*** 
 
60 
0.1696 
0.4047 
-3.252 
0.0011*** 
 
61 
0.1741 
0.3805 
-3.252 
0.0003*** 
 
60 
0.1823 
0.3763 
-3.708 
0.0004*** 
 
63 
0.1427 
0.3831 
-3.620 
0.0019*** 
 
62 
0.1213 
0.3280 
-3.052 
0.0010*** 
 
59 
0.2393 
0.2655 
-3.277 
0.0027*** 
Panel B: 
Non-Oil  N 
Median MLP 
Median C co. 
M.W. T 
P-Value 
 
19 
0.0120 
0.0107 
0.4476 
0.3320 
 
7 
0.1149 
0.2393 
-0.5602 
0.3088 
 
8 
0.0761 
0.2390 
-0.9423 
0.1929 
 
11 
0.0053 
0.1641 
-2.854 
0.0120** 
 
22 
0.0145 
0.1800 
-3.186 
0.0031*** 
 
39 
0.1020 
0.2416 
-2.428 
0.0107** 
 
44 
0.1161 
0.3201 
-3.374 
0.0010*** 
 
41 
0.1356 
0.4030 
-3.174 
0.0018*** 
 
44 
0.1645 
0.3446 
-3.334 
0.0011*** 
 
43 
0.1500 
0.4001 
-3.248 
0.0014*** 
 
44 
0.1207 
0.4437 
-3.000 
0.0026*** 
 
43 
0.1153 
0.3822 
-3.228 
0.0015*** 
 
44 
0.1014 
0.2636 
-2.824 
0.0040*** 
Panel C: 
Oil Firms  N 
Median MLP 
Median C co. 
M.W. T 
P-Value 
 
13 
0.0038 
-0.0539 
1.497 
0.0817* 
 
4 
0.0616 
0.3020 
-2.898 
0.0514* 
 
6 
0.0900 
0.1709 
-1.743 
0.0782* 
 
11 
0.0456 
0.1745 
-1.599 
0.0730* 
 
18 
0.1032 
0.3818 
-1.939 
0.0363** 
 
20 
0.1025 
0.3817 
-2.086 
0.0269** 
 
21 
0.1412 
0.5155 
-1.547 
0.0695* 
 
19 
0.2219 
0.4064 
-1.068 
0.1500 
 
17 
0.2263 
0.4403 
-1.604 
0.0654* 
 
17 
0.2498 
0.3441 
-1.528 
0.0740 
 
19 
0.2251 
0.3082 
-1.038 
0.1567 
 
19 
0.2280 
0.2632 
-0.7105 
0.2440 
 
15 
0.2482 
0.2771 
-0.8885 
0.1955 
*    indicates significance at the 10 percent level, **   indicates significance at the 5 percent level, ***  indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
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Table 3:  Changes in the debt-to-assets ratios and debt-to-assets levels for the risk matched sample test. 
 
Description Overall 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 
Panel A: 
All Firms  N 
Median MLP 
Median C co. 
M.W. T 
P-Value 
 
43 
0.0129 
0.0206 
0.4944 
0.3119 
 
12 
0.3016 
0.2674 
-0.5117 
0.3140 
 
16 
0.1774 
0.2977 
-1.177 
0.1294 
 
25 
0.2385 
0.3098 
-1.628 
0.0589* 
 
52 
0.2498 
0.3550 
-2.779 
0.0042*** 
 
66 
0.2624 
0.3654 
-3.034 
0.0019*** 
 
67 
0.2586 
0.3533 
-2.601 
0.0060*** 
 
61 
0.2671 
0.3475 
-2.036 
0.0023*** 
 
62 
0.3050 
0.3348 
-1.482 
0.0718* 
 
64 
0.2765 
0.3483 
-1.310 
0.0974* 
 
65 
0.3196 
0.3393 
-0.5832 
0.2806 
 
66 
0.3358 
0.3387 
-0.1906 
0.4352 
 
62 
0.3908 
0.3325 
0.1593 
0.5625 
Panel B: 
Non-Oil  N 
Median MLP 
Median C co. 
M.W. T 
P-Value 
 
27 
0.0234 
0.0616 
0.0600 
0.4794 
 
8 
0.3016 
0.2674 
-0.4086 
0.3590 
 
10 
0.1811 
0.2647 
-0.8258 
0.2182 
 
12 
0.1383 
0.2937 
-1.1031 
0.1480 
 
32 
0.2240 
0.3550 
-1.892 
0.0346** 
 
46 
0.2893 
0.3591 
-2.465 
0.0093*** 
 
45 
0.2575 
0.3533 
-2.528 
0.0081*** 
 
40 
0.2793 
0.3678 
-2.335 
0.0130** 
 
44 
0.3288 
0.3800 
-1.531 
0.0666* 
 
44 
0.3396 
0.3901 
-0.9089 
0.1838 
 
46 
0.3313 
0.3716 
-0.3423 
0.3673 
 
47 
0.3804 
0.3536 
-0.0339 
0.4879 
 
46 
0.3908 
0.3271 
-0.0855 
0.5326 
Panel C: 
Oil Firms  N 
Median MLP 
Median C co. 
M.W. T 
P-Value 
 
16 
0.0002 
-0.0018 
0.9793 
0.1720 
 
4 
0.2718 
0.3289 
-0.5477 
0.3390 
 
6 
0.1644 
0.3511 
-0.9571 
0.1986 
 
13 
0.2621 
0.3441 
-1.162 
0.1349 
 
20 
0.2598 
0.3597 
-2.023 
0.0302** 
 
20 
0.2445 
0.3654 
-1.748 
0.0494** 
 
22 
0.2605 
0.3686 
-0.8184 
0.2112 
 
21 
0.2671 
0.3400 
-0.2362 
0.4110 
 
18 
0.2919 
0.3108 
-0.3750 
0.3591 
 
20 
0.2412 
0.3136 
-1.085 
0.1459 
 
19 
0.3044 
0.3286 
-0.7399 
0.2350 
 
19 
0.3232 
0.3198 
-0.3317 
0.3750 
 
16 
0.3771 
0.3358 
-0.0371 
0.5075 
*    indicates significance at the 10 percent level, **   indicates significance at the 5 percent level, ***  indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
 
Table 4:  Changes in the debt-to-equity ratios and debt-to-equity levels for the Risk matched sample. 
 
Description Overall 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 
Panel A: 
All Firms  N 
Median MLP 
Median C co. 
M.W. T 
P-Value 
 
31 
0.0120 
0.0124 
-0.1746 
0.4332 
 
11 
0.0970 
0.1582 
-1.127 
0.1448 
 
14 
0.0761 
0.2132 
-2.213 
0.0253** 
 
22 
0.0360 
0.1844 
-3.791 
0.0010*** 
 
39 
0.0616 
0.1902 
-2.952 
0.0032*** 
 
60 
0.1007 
0.2421 
-3.357 
0.0009*** 
 
65 
0.1119 
0.2702 
-3.126 
0.0015*** 
 
60 
0.1575 
0.2854 
-2.579 
0.0066*** 
 
60 
0.1673 
0.2746 
-2.988 
0.0023*** 
 
60 
0.1557 
0.2716 
-2.421 
0.0097** 
 
63 
0.1427 
0.2707 
-1.901 
0.0313** 
 
63 
0.1252 
0.2084 
-1.639 
0.0533** 
 
60 
0.1441 
0.2207 
-1.726 
0.0451** 
Panel B: 
Non-Oil  N 
Median MLP 
Median C co. 
M.W. T 
P-Value 
 
19 
0.0120 
0.1580 
-1.626 
0.9383 
 
7 
0.1149 
0.1787 
-0.8210 
0.2283 
 
8 
0.0761 
0.2483 
-1.537 
0.0882* 
 
11 
0.0053 
0.2016 
-3.440 
0.0059*** 
 
22 
0.0145 
0.1646 
-2.635 
0.0091*** 
 
40 
0.0997 
0.2375 
-2.711 
0.0055*** 
 
44 
0.1066 
0.2988 
-3.314 
0.0012*** 
 
41 
0.1289 
0.3016 
-3.152 
0.0019*** 
 
43 
0.1549 
0.3016 
-2.966 
0.0029*** 
 
42 
0.1410 
0.2765 
-2.148 
0.0195** 
 
44 
0.1207 
0.2725 
-1.836 
0.0371** 
 
44 
0.1164 
0.2348 
-1.601 
0.0586* 
 
44 
0.1028 
0.2118 
-1.793 
0.0405** 
Panel C: 
Oil Firms  N 
Median MLP 
Median C co. 
M.W. T 
P-Value 
 
12 
0.0439 
-0.0181 
1.288 
0.1135 
 
4 
0.0616 
0.1060 
-0.6990 
0.2898 
 
6 
0.0900 
0.1911 
-1.526 
0.1004 
 
11 
0.0456 
0.1672 
-1.917 
0.4540 
 
17 
0.1005 
0.2192 
-1.528 
0.7410 
 
20 
0.1017 
0.2654 
-1.869 
0.0399** 
 
21 
0.1192 
0.2591 
-0.8142 
0.2128 
 
19 
0.2219 
0.2271 
-0.1296 
0.4539 
 
17 
0.2263 
0.2498 
-0.8402 
0.2072 
 
18 
0.2265 
0.2335 
-0.9478 
0.1785 
 
19 
0.2251 
0.2034 
-0.5641 
0.2912 
 
19 
0.2280 
0.1844 
-0.3028 
0.3896 
 
16 
0.2506 
0.2274 
-0.1855 
0.4332 
*    indicates significance at the 10 percent level, **   indicates significance at the 5 percent level, ***  indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this paper we analyze the theoretical changes in firm value and gains from leverage associated 
with tax rate changes.  The theoretical changes are based on a valuation model developed in Jalbert (2002).  The 
implied changes in capital structure are examined by using a sample of MLP’s along with two, matched samples of C-
corporations.  Two tests are conducted, an overall test and a yearly test.  The overall test provides little evidence of a 
capital structure change around the 1986 TRA.  The yearly tests provide strong evidence of a capital structure shift 
around the 1986 TRA.  Specifically, MLPs are found to have increased the use of debt in conjunction with the 1986 
TRA as was predicted by the theory.   
 
This research provides managers with a theoretical foundation to determine the expected change in firm value 
associated with a tax rate change.  Moreover, this work provides insights to managers about if, and the extent to which 
their capital structures should be modified in response to a tax rate change.  Finally, the model provides a theoretical 
framework to determine appropriate capital structure changes when tax rates are expected to change.  This research 
will also be useful for policy makers who set tax rates.  By examining the changes in the gain from leverage associated 
with various tax schemes and setting tax rates accordingly, policymakers can encourage the uses of preferable sources 
of financing in the economy.  If there is a public utility to be gained from a given aggregate financing scheme in firms, 
this research will help policy makers set tax rates in such a manner to encourage firms to finance themselves in this 
pattern.       
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